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A COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF RURAL CREDIT:
STATE-CONTINGENT LOANS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
Abstract

In much recent theoretical literature, the problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection are assumed to be decisive for the organization of
agrarian institutions.

In contrast, it is found that credit transactions

in northern Nigeria take advantage of the free flow of information within
rural communities.

Information asymmetries are important, and their

institutional consequences - the use of collateral and interlinked
contracts - are absent.

Credit transactions play a direct role in pooling

risk between households through the use of contracts in which the
repayment owed by the borrower depends on the realization of random
production shocks by both the borrower and the lender.
The paper presents a model which explores the general equilibrium
consequences of contingent contracts in a dynamic setting.

The prices

required to support a Pareto optimum are derived, yielding predicted
transaction flows over time.

Estimates of the model indicate that

quantitatively important state - contingent payments are embedded in these
loan transactions.

Further testing indicates that a fully efficient

risk-pooling equilibrium is not achieved through these transactions.
The research is based on a year long survey in Zaria, Nigeria
conducted by the author.

KEY WORDS:
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1.

The Theoretical and Geographical Setting. 1
People who live in the rural areas of poor countries often must cope not

only with severe poverty but with extremely variable incomes.

In uncertain

environments which lack complete insurance markets, credit transactions take
on a special role by allowing people to smooth income shocks over time. 2
This paper provides a competitive general equilibrium analysis of the role
played by the rural credit markets of northern Nigeria in facilitating the
efforts of households to cope with risk.
The usual assumption in the literature on rural credit in poor countries
is that simple competitive models are irrelevant to the study of these
markets.

Moral hazard and adverse selection are considered to be especially

prevalent in credit transactions, therefore, credit markets are commonly
thought to incorporate organizational features that serve to mitigate the
problems caused by these information asymmetries.

A number of theoretical

papers have explored the implications of imperfect information for contractual
forms in credit markets in low-income rural settings, and a set of specific
institutional features has been hypothesized to be prevalent in these
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and Kotwal (1989) provide a recent theoretical treatment.
Rosenzweig (1990) examines the insurance role of credit transactions in India.
1

markets. 3

In contrast to the assumptions of this literature, I argue in

earlier work (Udry [1990]) that information asymmetries between borrowers and
lenders in northern Nigeria are unimportant. 4

Neither formal sector lending

institutions nor specialized private moneylenders participate in the credit
market.

There is widespread participation on both sides of the credit market

in these villages; over the course of the survey year 75 percent of households
made loans and 65 percent of households borrowed (SO percent participated as
both lenders and borrowers).

The transactions occurred between people who

know each other well; 97 percent of the loans (weighted by value) were between
neighbors or between relatives.

For 82 percent of loans, survey participants

were able to provide an accounting of activities on the farms of those from
whom they borrowed, or to whom they lent (Udry [1990, p. 259)).

Common

institutional adaptations to information asymmetries are not found in this
credit market.

There is no evidence of contractual interlinkages involving

3

See Bell (1988), Bardhan (1989) and Udry (1991b) for comprehensive
bibliographies. Two organizational features
collateral use and market
interlinkages - have received particular attention.
4

This research program is based on a survey of 200 households in 4 villages
near the city of Zaria that I undertook from February 1988 to February 1989. Tl-1e
survey consisted of monthly interviews with each of the household heads and
(separately) his wives. The questionnaires were designed to yield a complete
picture of each household's asset and debt position; an account of its credit,
labor, product, asset, and asset-rental transactions over the previous month; and
a range of demographic and background data. For details on the study area and
survey methodology, see Udry (1991b). Summary data from the survey are presented
in Table 1.
The are in the heart of one of the most dynamic and promising agricultural
regions of Africa. Rain-fed agriculture predominates, though there is also dry
season irrigated farming on lowlands bordering streams (fadama). 73 percent of
the sample households produce vegetables and non-food cash crops for the market
and 53 percent of all labor used on sample household farms was wage labor. 95
percent of cultivated land was treated with chemical fertilizers. A large variety
of nonagricultural occupations exists, including small-scale industry, trading,
and the provision of transport services, but every household in the research
villages operates a farm.
2

loans, and only 3 percent of loans (by value) are backed by collateral (Udry
(1990, section III]).

There is little direct evidence, therefore, of any

important deviation from the complete information assumption of the standard
competitive framework.

This simple framework, therefore, serves as the

starting point of this paper.
The free flow of information within these rural communities allows
credit contracts to play a direct role in insuring against risk.

The survey

data indicate that the repayment owed on a loan depends upon random shocks
received by both borrower and lender over the period during which the loan is
outstanding, permitting these households to directly pool their idiosyncratic
risk.

Table 2 provides an example of the evidence presented in Udry (1990) in

support of the hypothesis of state-contingent contracting.

Realized interest

rates are lower and repayment periods are longer for debtor households who
have experienced adverse shocks (Table 2, panel A).

This observation is

consistent with conventional credit contracts because those who experience
adverse shocks are more likely to default.

The evidence that repayments

respond not only to the entire circumstances of the debtor household, but also
to those of the creditor household (Table 2, panel B), however, is not
consistent with conventional models.

The flexibility of these contractual

forms allows for more efficient risk sharing between the debtor and the
creditor than is possible with conventional fixed interest contracts.
Furthermore, this flexibility permits credit transactions to conform to the
Islamic prohibition of fixed interest rates. 5
5

Investment income is prohibited if the investor does not share in the risks
of the enterprise. Hence an equity investment is legal, while lending with a
fixed interest rate is not. Risk must be shared in proportion to the capital
contributed to an enterprise, thus not any state-contingent credit contract is
legal under Shari'a law. Fixed repayment periods are also prohibited: 'And if
3

In section 2 I develop a competitive general equilibrium model of state
contingent loan contracting in order to formally test the hypothesis that
these credit transactions include state-contingent repayments.

In section 3 I

present estimates which confirm the quantitative importance (as well as
statistical significance) of state-contingent payments that flow toward
households which receive unexpected adverse production shocks.
The apparent importance of direct risk pooling through state-contingent
loan repayments raises the possibility that the allocation of resources within
these villages approximates Pareto efficiency.

If these loan transactions

mimic a complete set of competitive insurance markets, then it is not
necessary to understand the particular contractual arrangements in these
credit markets in order to discern the economic impact of the loans.

On the

other hand, if Pareto efficiency is not achieved through these loan
transactions, then a more detailed investigation of the institutional and
informational setting of these transactions becomes imperative.

Therefore, in

section 3 I present a formal test of the hypothesis that full risk pooling is
achieved through these transactions.

The results indicate that full risk

pooling is not achieved in these four northern Nigerian villages.

A number of

studies have recently explored the complete markets hypothesis in other
contexts.

Townsend (1991) shows that there is a high degree of co-movement in

individual (age-sex adjusted) consumptipn across households within villages
covered by the ICRISAT Indian survey.

He presents some evidence, however,

that a fully Pareto efficient allocation is not achieved in the Indian
villages.

Lim (1990), using data from the same ICRISAT survey, tests the

the debtor is in difficulty, then [there should be] postponement to a time of
ease' (Koran 2:280).
4

hypothesis of full Pareto efficiency against the alternative 'permanent
income' hypothesis that each household separately smooths its income shocks
over time.

He concludes that the data correspond more closely to full Pareto

efficiency than to the permanent income hypothesis.

The complete markets

hypothesis has also been tested with data from the U.S ..

Altonji, Hayshi and

Kotilkoff (1991), Altug and Miller (1990), Mace (1989), and Cochrane (1989)
provide examples of empirical tests of implications of Pareto efficiency.
Only Altug and Miller (1990) are unable to reject the (stringent) standard
that a complete risk pooling, Pareto efficient allocation of resources is
achieved in the U.S ..
2.

A Competitive Model.
Consider a competitive model of the credit market.

This model embraces

the notion that information flows freely within the community and that loan
contracts are state-contingent.

It does so at the cost of treating these

personalized contracts in a highly abstract manner, in that it views the
household as a price-taker on the loan market.

Detailed consideration of the

institutional details of the transactions is the subject of Udry (1991a).

The

focus of this section will be the general equilibrium and efficiency
consequences of the availability of state-contingent loan contracting.
A wide variety of financial instruments could be devised to pool risks
in a village community.

I will focus only on contracts which are taken in one

period and discharged in the next.

This one-period-ahead contracting

corresponds to the transactions observed during the fieldwork, in which loans
are taken just before (or early in) the planting season and repaid after
harvest.

5

A. Loan Contacts as State Contingent Securities.
Consider a world with only one (non-storable) good (Y) and N households.
Let there be T+l periods, indexed byte [0,T].

There are S states of nature

indexed bys, each with an objective, constant and commonly known probability
of occurrence

~s.

This probability is stationary and independent of the

history of realized states. 6

There is no production; each household receives

each period an endowment of the good which depends upon the realized state of
nature. 7

Denote these (positive) endowments by

Yi,s

for l~i~ and l~s~S.

The

endowment of each household depends only on the state of nature, not on the
period.
Each bilateral loan contract is interpreted as a collection of
contingent securities, where each security R5 entitles the owner to one unit
of the good Yin the next period if states is realized.

These contracts are

perfectly enforced; default is assumed to be impossible.

If default were

permitted, under general conditions some households would demand an infinitely
large loan at any interest rate, with certain default in the next period.

The

no default assumption can be dropped and the existence of equilibrium
maintained only if other special assumptions are made.
the demand for credit by a household could be posited. 8

Exogenous limits on
Global restrictions

could be placed on utility functions so that the cost of a certain default
next period outweighs the benefit of even infinitely large borrowing this

6

This assumption is made to
autocorrelation are permitted below.
7

simplify

notation.

Some

forms

of

Production and storage are permitted in the appendix.

8

This is the strategy of Srivastava (1989), and would be adopted by Kletzer
to correct a difficulty in the interest rate equilibrium of Kletzer (1984)
(personal communication).
6

period.

Finally, the assumption of price-taking behavior could be dropped,

thereby introducing strategic behavior by borrowers and lenders who negotiate
over contractual terms and the size of the loan.

It is this later approach

that I adopt in Udry (1991a).
If the available securities span the state space, the competitive
equilibrium will be Pareto efficient.

The first task, therefore, is to

describe the relevant characteristics of efficient allocations.
{s 1 ,s 2 ,
t.

...

,stl be the history of states realized from period 1 through period

Let N(slht) be the count of occurrences of states in history ht over the

t periods.

Then the probability of any history ht is
S

1.

Let ht -

1r(h

. t

s

N(slh )
t

II (1r )

)

s=l

Let ci,s,tCht_1 ) be the realized consumption of individual i if state s occurs
in period t after history ht-l• and cio by the consumption of household i in
the initial period.

The separable von Neumann-Morgenstern utility of

household i is:
T

2.

U(c

iO

)

l:
t-1

s
1r(h

t-1

) [

~

s=l

1rs

U(c.
(h
))]]
1.,s,t t-1

t-1

where Ht-l is the set of all possible histories that may be realized up to
period t-1. 9

The innermost summation is the undiscounted expected utility in

period t given that history ht-l has occurred.

1r(ht_1 ) is the probability that

history ht-l occurs, and the intermediate sum is over all possible histories
through period t-1.

The outermost summation finds the value of the expected

9

This specification of the utility function is required only for the
comparative static analysis. All of the other results below follow as long as
the utility function is separable in time.
7

..,

utility stream by discounting over the T periods.

In the interest of

parsimony in notation, utility functions are assumed to be identical across
all households.

U() is assumed to be increasing, strictly concave and twice

continuously differentiable over a++.

Finally, U'(x)

Certain familiar results follow immediately.
allocation, c 1 ,s,tCht-i) = c 1 ,s,t for all ht-l
independent of history.

E

Ht-l·

➔ +co

as x

➔

o+.

In a Pareto efficient
That is, consumption is

There is no growth in the economy, therefore c 1 ,s,t

c 1 ,s for all t>O, i, ands.

==

That is, consumption is independent of period.

Finally, each household's consumption in any states is a non-decreasing
function of the total community resources available in that state.

Transient

changes in income will be fully pooled at the community level, so no risk
diversification will occur within the household.

These immediate conclusions

are patently false 10 , but the idea of state-contingent loan contracts with
multiple partners remains compelling.

My strategy is to use these efficiency

results to examine the consequences of fully flexible contingent markets and
then to introduce restrictions that modify the fully Pareto optimal, risk
pooling outcome of the initial model.
The notational convention to be used will be that subscripts refer to
states realized in the current period, while superscripts refer to states
which may occur in the next period.

So let R::t<ht_ 1 ) be the security

purchased in states of period t after history ht-l for payment in states' of
period t+l.

Let q::t<ht_ 1 ) be the price of that security on the competitive

market.
The household's preferences have been described in equation 2.

The good

is not storable, so the budget constraints are:
10As

confirmed, for example, by recent work by Rosenzweig and Stark (1989).
8

1

1

't"' s
s
3. c 0 =Y8 -Lqs,oXR
8 ,o for t-0.

s'

sis the state realized in period 0.

income when states is realized.

Initial period consumption is the income

received in the state realized in period zero minus the net amount spent on
purchasing securities for the various states that may occur in period 1.

This

amount may be positive or negative because borrowing (short selling) is
permitted.
T, for all s.

s*

equal to the
income received in the states realized in that period, plus the number of
bonds (which may be negative) purchased in the previous period for payment if
states occurs in period t, minus the net amount spent on purchasing
securities for the various states that may occur in the next period.

period T-1.

In the final period, consumption equals the income received in

that period plus the number of bonds purchased in period T-1 for payment if
states occurs in the final period.
The household maximizes (2) given (1) and (3-5), and calculates its
demands for contingent securities for all possible histories hT.

This assumes

that the household knows with certainty the prices that will prevail at time t
after any history ht.

The problem as written is equivalent to the sequential

programming problem in which the household re-optimizes each period as the
state is revealed.
C. Efficiency of Equilibrium and the Behavior of Prices.
If the assumption that the contingent securities span the state space is
valid, then markets are complete in this model and the competitive equilibrium

9

will be Pareto efficient.

After substituting necessary conditions for

efficiency into the first order conditions of the household's optimization
program, we find that the prices required to support the efficient equilibrium
must satisfy:
i

6.

,r

qs , t(ht-1)

i

,r

i

U'(c.)

i,j,sES,
for all t.

l.

U' (c.)

J

So the relative prices of the different securities are constant across time.
Thus, we can find a scaler rt for each s, s'ES such that

7.

q

s'

s,t

(h

t-1

)

r x q

s'

where r

t

t

>

0 and

~

s'

q

s'

1.

This normalization is arbitrary, but has the advantage of excluding the
possibility of using a security with a zero price as numeraire.

Security

prices are determined by the time-, history-, and state-independent set of
normalized relative prices qs' and by the scaling factor rt.

After imposing

the constraint that in any Pareto Optimum consumption will be time-and
history-independent we find:

8.

s'
qs*,t(ht-1)

for alls, s' ,s*, l~t<T, wheres is the

s'

qs,O
state realized in period 0, s* is the state realized in period t, ands' are
the states that may occur in period t+l.

Therefore, given the initial period

state, the scaling factor r in any period t will depend only on c 5 .,t(ht-i)-c 5 . ,
the realized consumption in that period, which in turn depends only on that
state realized in that period.

The higher community income and therefore

consumption in that state, the higher will be rt.
A higher rt implies that borrowing in period t for repayment in period
t+l is less expensive.

In return for a promise of a given set of repayments

10

A higher r means that more is received in period t for given repayments in
period t+l - cheaper credit.

Thus in a state in which community income and

individual households' consumption is high, credit is cheap.

As community

income and each households' consumption declines, credit becomes more
expensive, choking off the potential increase in excess demand for credit in
this closed market, and thus preserving equilibrium.
D. Time Pattern of Securities Purchases.
Now consider the situation in period T-1.

From the budget constraint

and efficiency we know that for all histories hT-l,
=

C

s

for alls.

regardless of history hT-z or the states* realized in period T-1.

So the

security purchased in period T-1 for payment in period T if states occurs is
R5 T-l• regardless of the history of states realized up to and including period
T-1.

The sum ~(qsxRsT_ 1 ) (summed over the states s) may be positive or
negative; suppose it is positive (the household is a lender).

Depending upon

the state realized in period T-1, the prices q will be scaled by rT-l f(sT-l).

The amount lent will be rT-l~(qsxRsT_1 ) > 0.

This amount depends only

upon the state realized in period T-1; it is independent of history hT-Z•
Thus in any state s' of period T-1, after payment of R::,T_ 2 (hT_3 ) (purchased in
states* of period T-2 after history hT_ 3 for payment if states' occurs in
period T-1), the household must have cs' + rT-l~(qsxRsT_ 1 ) in order to purchase
the required securities R5 T and still consume Cs•·
9.

Y

s'

s'

+ R

s*,T-2

(h

T-3

)

c

s'

+ r

~(q

T-1 s

11

s
X

R

That is,

s

T-1

)

a

I

s'
T-1

for all s'.

Therefore, regardless of the state in period T-2, the household must purchase
securities R8 T-2 sufficient to ensure that in period T-1 it will have funds
enough to consume along the Pareto efficient path and purchase the securities
required for period T.

The securities RT_2 , purchased in period T-2, are

independent of the history of states realized up to and including period T_2 •
This demonstration of history-independence can obviously be repeated for R8 T_3 ,
etc ...
A definite relationship exists between c, IT-l• IT-2 , and so on.
L(q5 xR8 T-l) > 0, as we assumed above, then IT-l > c in each element.

If

This

implies that R5 T-2 > RT-l in each element, which in turn implies L(q 5 xRT_2 ) >
L(q 5 XR8 T-l).

So, IT-2 > IT-l, and so on.

Starting from period T-k moving

towards period T, we see that in each realized state the household becomes a
smaller and smaller lender.

The largest lending occurs in period O and is

equal to Y 0 -c 0 , where c 0 is the component of the c vector that corresponds to
the state realized in period 0.

Alternatively, if Y0 -c 0 < 0, the household

will be a borrower in all periods, with its largest borrowing in period 0.
This analysis can be summarized in a simple diagram (Fig 1).
community income (Y) may be different in the different states.

Total

In this figure

I have indexed the states by total community income in that state.

The vector

c here becomes a line, describing individual income as a function of the state
(s).

The diagram is drawn for a world of four periods.

In period 3 the

household purchases securities R5 3 such that when the state is revealed in
period 4, it will pay (or receive) just enough to consume on c.

As drawn, the

state realized in period 4 has community income Y4 and household income Y4 , so
the household receives the payment R3 54 •
positive.

As drawn, the sum Lq 8 XR8 3 is

The total cost of purchasing securities R3 (the amount lent, which
12

is equal to r(s)~q 8 xR8 3 ) will vary depending on the state realized in period
3.

r(s) will be low in states in which consumption is low (credit is

expensive) and high in states of high consumption.
equals the amount r(s)~q 8 xR8 3 •

The gap between Ir-i and c

The securities R2 (which the household

purchases in period 2 for payment in period 3) must be such that after the
state is revealed in period 3, the household will pay (or receive) an amount
that will put it on the line Ir-i•

The household will then have the resources

to purchase the securities R3 and still consume on c.

As drawn, the state in

period 3 has community income Y3 and household income Y3 , so the household
makes the payment R2 53 •

The backward induction continues until at period zero

the household spends r(s)~q 5 XR5 0 to purchase the first period securities and
consume on c.
The model implies that the securities purchased in any period tare
independent of the state realized in that or any previous period.

The cost of

the securities purchased in period twill depend, however, on rt, which in
turn depends on aggregate community income in period t.
time the households regress toward zero net lending.

Furthermore, over

This later finding may

be more difficult to verify empirically than it was to show theoretically.

As

the number of periods Tis increased, the period-to-period change in net
lending is reduced. 11

Other factors are also changing over time.

In

particular, if the age of a household head has any effect on his productivity,
it may be difficult to separate the effects of progressing age from movement
across periods.

This point is reinforced by the fact that the number of

11 In

a Barro-Becker model of altruism across generations trading will
effectively continue forever as long as bequests are positive.
In such a
situation, Tis infinite and this derivative is zero.

13

periods of loan transactions remaining to a household is uncertain, and the
best predictor of that number may be the age of the household head.
The model can easily be modified to include agricultural production on a
fixed amount of land.
still pooled.

The optimality results remain and community income is

It can be shown (appendix A) that investment in agricultural

production is directed to plots on which output is less correlated with
overall community income and that this diversification is carried out at the
community level, not the household level.

If there is more than one

alternative asset (e.g., different plots of land), it can again be shown that
investment is guided by the goal of reducing the variance of community income
so no diversification occurs at the household level.
E. Transactions Costs
A significant number of households neither lend nor borrow (42
households).

This fact does not accord well with a theoretical model based on

a smoothly operating competitive market with no default.
call upon the deus ex machina of transactions costs.

I will therefore

If there is a cost to

entry into the securities market in any period (which perhaps increases with
transaction size), then there is a positive probability that a zero loan size
is optimal.

Justification for allowing for the possibility of transactions

costs can be provided by assuming that some effort must be expended to observe
the realized state or to enforce the no-default provision of these contracts.
Inflows to and outflows from each household must now be distinguished,
in order to account properly for the transactions costs that intervene between
the transfer from one household and that received by another.

Let I 1 ,s,t(ht-i)

be the gross transfer to household i (inflow) if states occurs in period t
after history (ht- 1 ) and 0 1 ,s,t<ht-i) be the gross transfer from household i
14

(outflow) if states occurs in period t after history (ht_1 ).

The form of

transactions costs used here is that of Samuelson (1954) - of each unit of the
good that is given up by a household, only a fraction k reaches the recipient
household.
Any Pareto Optimum can be generated by maximizing an appropriately
weighted sum of the utility functions (eq. 2) of the N households subject to
the resource constraints:
10. c 10 =YJ,s-OJ,s,o +Ij,s,o
11. cJ,s,t<ht-1> =Y1,s-OJ,s,t<ht-1>
12. IJ,s,e<ht-1> .?:0,

OJ,s,e<he-1> .?:0

13.

Transactions costs enter through constraint 13.

With O<k<l, it is trivial to

show that no household will both receive inflows and give up outflows in any
single state after a particular history in the efficient allocation.
The first order conditions imply that all households with an outflow of
the good in states, in period t, history ht-l have the same weighted marginal
utility of consumption.
in the Pareto program:
14 .

A U' ( c

i

i,s,t

(h

t-1

))

AU'(c

j

A

s,t

(h

1r(h )
T

Similarly,
15.

The weights are the Ai, the weight of their utility

A

j,s,t

(h

t-1

))

s,t

(h

1r (h )
T

t-1

/3

· k, for all i s.t. 0

t

t-1

/3

)

t

i,s,t

(h

t-1

) > 0.

)

, for all j s.t. I

j,s,t

(h

t-1

) > 0.

Finally, the first order conditions with the non-negativity constraints
binding imply that any household h which does not receive any inflow, or give

15

up any outflow of the good must have a weighted marginal utility of
consumption that falls within the bounds set by 14 and 15:

for all i such that 0 1 ,s,t<ht-i) > 0, j such that Ij,s,t<ht- 1) > 0, and h such
that Oii,s,t(ht-i)

=

Ih,s,t<ht-1)

=

0.

As k

➔

1, the efficient allocation

approaches that achieved with no transactions costs.

The optimal allocation

in the case of two households can be understood with reference to figure 2.
The vertical axis measures the income and consumption of household i; the
Suppose 0 1 ts(ht-i) > 0.

horizontal axis measures the same for household j.
From 13 , Ijt 5 (ht-1 ) = k ·Oit 5 ( h t-1) •

From 14 and ·15 , we f1°nd

U' (cft(ht-i))
-- k>..J.
s
>,.
1

U ( Cjt (ht-1))
In figure 2, OA is the locus of (cj, c 1 ) such that this condition is

satisfied.

i

Similarly, suppose Itt 5 (ht_1) > 0.

of (cj, c 1 ) such that this
Ojt 5 (ht-1)

=

IJt 5 (ht_1)

=

k>..J U 1 (Yf)
>..J
0, t hen --<---<~.
A1

u 1 (Y;)

When the state is such that

KA1

the point (Yj 5 ,Y15 ) falls between OA and OB, then no transfer takes place.

If

(Yjs,Y15 ) falls above OA (as at point 1), then i transfers to j with (only k of
each unit reaching j) until the locus OA is reached (as at point 2).

If

(Yj 5 ,Y1 s) falls below OB (as at point 3), then j transfers to i with (only k of
each unit reaching i) until the locus OB is reached (as at point 4).
It can be seen, therefore, that the efficient consumption streams and
transfers can be determined with knowledge of the distribution of income Y,
the transactions cost k, and the social weights >.. 1 .
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The period t and the

history of realized states ht-l are irrelevant to the determination of
efficient transfers.
Now consider competitive equilibrium with these transactions costs.
Define B::t<ht_1 ) as the purchase of a security in states of period t after
history ht-l for payment in period t+l is states' occurs.
price an agent pays to buy the security.

s:'.tCht_1 ) is the sale of a security

in states of period t after history ht-l for payment in period t+l if state
s' occurs, q:'.t<ht_ 1 ) is the price received by the agent for the sale.

The

household's problem is to choose Bf tCht_ 1 ) and sf tCht_ 1 ) for all s, t, and ht E
Ht to maximize (2) subject to non-negativity on Band Sand

for O < t < T,

19 · cs,T(hT-1> = Ys+B;,,T- 1 Chr-2> -s;',T-1 (hT-2>

s,s*E S.

s* is the state realized in period t-1 after history

ht-1 ; s is the state realized in period t.

Thus i::[qft(ht_ 1 )xs::t<ht-i) -

PftCht-1 )xBftCht-i)] (summing over the states which may occur next period, s')
is the net borrowing of the household in states of period t after history ht,
and B:'.tCht_1 )

-

s:'.t<ht-i) is the net repayments to the household if s' occurs

in period t+l.

Competition in the transfer of securities between households

constant returns to scale transfer technology.

No profits are made by agents

engaged in transferring securities, so such activity does not affect the
budget constraints 17-19.

As in the model without transactions costs, the

contingent securities span the state space.

The wedge between the buying and

17

f._

V

..,...

selling prices of the securities induces households to internalize the
transactions costs and the competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
3. An Econometric Model.

In this section I present an econometric model of loan transactions in
rural northern Nigeria.

Each loan contract observed in the data is modeled as

a collection of state contingent securities.

The variables of interest are

the net borrowing of the household over a specified period (B), and the net
repayment of those loans (REP).

The convention observed in the empirical work

is that all amounts flowing to a sample household are positive.

The net

borrowing observed in the data in states of period t after history ht-l is
the net revenue from the securities sold, ~[ q:\(ht_ 1)xs:\(ht-i) p::t(ht-1)Bft(ht-i)] = B.

The net repayments to the household if state s' is

realized in period t+l are B::t<ht_1)-Sf tCht_1) - REP.

The solution to the

household problem implicitly defines a net demand function REP(.) for a
particular security, and therefore also a net supply function of all
securities B(.).

Net borrowing of household i Bi will be a function of a

vector o_f exogenous shifters Xi, of the nwnber of periods the household has
been involved in the market Pi and of a random disturbance v 1i.

Net

repayments to household i, REPi, will be a function of the same vector of
exogenous shifters Xi, of Pi, of a random disturbance v 2 i, and of idiosyncratic
production shocks received by the household (Si).

I asswne that the random

disturbances are jointly normally distributed.
The choice of explanatory variables to be included in the vector Xi will
be discussed in the following section, but it should be noted that Xi will
include village dummy variables to capture the effect of aggregate village
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production shocks on the cost of credit (the price level rt of the
securities).
Pi will be approximated by the number of years since the household

head's first married, or since he moved to his current village, whichever is
smaller.

This assumes that households enter the credit market as soon as they

are formed.

As noted above, net lending regresses toward zero over time.
I

I

Thus for a net lender, o(B 5 -S 5 )/oP=oREP/oP<Ofor alls(> 0 for a net
borrower).

The derivative of repayments with respect to period for net

borrowers has the opposite sign as the same derivative for net lenders.

The

switch in the sign of these derivatives depending upon the borrowing/lending
status of the household will require switching regression methods in the
estimation.
large.

Recall however that the derivative will be close to zero if Tis

For both net borrowers and net lenders the derivative of net borrowing

with respect to period has the opposite sign as the derivative of repayments
with respect to period.
Si, the indicator of the random shock received by the household after

the initial loans have been made, is an index of self-reported events on the
plots farmed by the household.

The index is a weighted average of the number

of these negative events (examples: flooding, lodging, animal invasions) on
each plot and the weights are the relative sizes of each plot.

The index is

broken down by upland and lowland plots, and is the same as that used in the
construction of Table 2.

Its use depends upon the assumption that the events

used in its construction are observable to the village community and exogenous
to the behavior of the agents.

Further, the deviation of the household's

index from the village mean index must be serially uncorrelated.

The first

assumption is strongly supported by the evidence presented Udry (1990).
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The

second assumption is more problematic, for while some events which enter the
index are plausibly exogenous (e.g. animal invasions), others are not.

The

probability of lodging or flooding, for example, can be influenced by farming
practices.

However, if farming activities themselves are observable to the

community the moral hazard otherwise arising from the endogeneity of these
events can be controlled.
stationarity assumption.

The third assumption corresponds to the
Village-level shocks can be correlated over time

without changing these results, for they influence only the price level rt,
and will be eliminated through use of the village dwnmy variables.

The

deviation of individual shocks from the village mean shock, however, must be
serially uncorrelated in order to support the equilibrium derived here.
Linear approximations to net borrowing Band net repayments REP are
estimated.

The net borrowing-equation is augmented with a friction model,

which allows for a positive probability of zero loan size.

The use of

Samuelson "iceberg" transactions costs implies that the particular form of
friction is that of Rosett (1959).
Once the possibility of non-participation in the market is acknowledged,
estimation of the repayment equation must take into account the selection bias
thereby induced.

In addition, as shown above, the derivatives of Band REP

with respect to period P change signs depending on net borrowing/lending
status.

This necessitates the use of switching regression methods in the

estimation of both Band REP.

The model is:

20. a. B = Xa + aBP + 111
or

if Xa + aBP + Ill> 0

b. B = Xa + aLP + Ill - F
else

if Xa + aLP + 11

c. B - 0
20

1

-

F

< 0

21.

REP

~

+ (1-I)PLP + IPBP + S1 + v2

where I-1 if B > 0, I-0 if B < 0
22.

REP -

0 if B

0

REP if B <> 0.
This model may suffer from incoherence because equations 20a and 20b can
be true simultaneously.

This is unlikely to be true In practice because it

requires the effect of Pon net borrowing to be so different when the
household borrows than when it lends that the household switches from
demanding loans to supplying loans. To lead to incoherence this switch must be
large enough to overcome the friction effect F.

I have made the ad hoc

assumption that the decision is made sequentially, as written, in order to
eliminate the theoretical possibility of incoherence.

Alternatively, a

sufficient condition for coherence is a 5>o:L and F > 0.
No variables are available which can serve to identify the friction
coefficient F separately from the net borrowing equation.

This coefficient is

identified, therefore, through the nonlinearity of the model and
distributional assumptions.

The likelihood function is presented in the

appendix B.
A. Data Definitions.
Table 3 lists the variables used.

The dependent variables are

calculated from data on all loans taken or extended by a sample household for
a single main cropping period.

The loans included in this analysis are those

initially extended during the period from the harvest before the survey began
until the middle of the main cropping season during the survey year
(September).

By September, early crops have been harvested and some loan

repayments begun.

Net borrowing Bi is the nominal value of loans taken minus
21
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loans extended during this period, while net repayments REPi is the net
nominal value of repayments received by the household on those loans.
The vector of explanatory variables Xi includes village dummy variables,
non-land wealth, the age of the household head, an indicator of the length of
time the household head's family has been resident in the village, an
indicator of the presence of a household member with certain skills, and land
holdings.

Certain specifications of the model also contain indicators of the

educational attainment of the household head.
The village dummy variables capture village-specific effects.

There are

infrastructural differences across the villages that will influence the net
demand for credit.

There are also likely to be differences in the social

environments of the different villages that affect the availability of
information and enforcement mechanisms needed to support these credit
transactions.

Finally, the village dummy variables capture the effect of the

village level production shocks.

In the net borrowing equation, the village

level shock will affect the price of credit, and therefore net nominal
borrowing.

In the repayment equation, the village dummy variables control for

the mean village production shock in order to isolate the effect of household
level deviations from this mean (Si) on repayments.
The wealth variable is equal to the value of holdings of grain, trading
stocks, livestock, and household goods (durable consumer goods such as radios,
housewares, and farming implements) at the start of the survey.

In figure 1,

an increase in wealth (Y0 ) rotates the vector Cup (this effect will be quite
small when Tis large). For any C and t, an increase in wealth also rotates
the vector It up, therefore, the derivative of net repayments with respect to
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wealth is always positive.

The derivative of net borrowing with respect to

wealth is negative. These signs hold for both net borrowers and net lenders.
The age of the household head (AGE) should influence net borrowing and
repayments in the same way as other fixed assets.

The effect of changes in

household fixed assets on loan size and repayments is found from the model
with production in the appendix. Intuitively, an increase in fixed asset
holdings increases the demand for the working capital needed to utilize the
asset.

Net borrowing must increase and net repayments to the household must

decline as fixed asset holdings increase. 12
The SKILLS variable is a dummy variable indicating the presence of at
least one household member with a special skill.

Such skills include

carpentry, traditional medicine, tailoring, or being a religious teacher.
This variable should act as a fixed asset, increasing the demand for working
capital in order to use the skill, and thus increasing the net borrowing of
the household and reducing net repayments to the household.
Land ownership is broken down into upland plots (UPLAND) and lowland
plots (LOWLAND) because the different types of land require different levels
of inputs.

Lowlands require much more intensive inputs than do uplands

(because the soil is heavier, and because farming can continue year-round).

I

also include squared terms in land ownership.
The HERELONG variable is a dummy variable which is one if the family of
the household head has been in the village for two or more generations (which
includes almost 70 percent of the sample).

12As

It is possible that families which

noted above, the age variable poses a special difficulty because of the
possibility that its effects might be confused with those of the period variable.
The household head's age may be as good a measure of P1 as is the number of years
since the household was formed.
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have only__recently moved into the village do not have as good access to
enforcement mechanisms as do other families.

This might reduce net repayments

to such households, and might lead them to reduce their net lending (increase
their net borrowing).
B. Estimation Results
The results are presented in Tables 4 through 7.
results of the base specification.

Table 4 presents the

In Table 5, separate estimates are

presented of the effects on net repayments of shocks to lenders and to
borrowers.

Tests of the hypothesis that complete risk pooling is achieved

through these loan transactions are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
1. State-Contingent Payments.
FIML estimates of the base model are reported in Table 4.

The results

support the hypothesis that repayments vary according to shocks received.
Adverse shocks received by the household lead to increases in repayments to
the sample household (reductions in repayments to other households), and the
estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero at the one
percent level.

A one standard deviation shock on upland plots increases

repayments to the household by N26; a similar shock on lowlands increases
repayments by N31.

Recall that the average size of a loan is N291.

These

results are robust to a variety of different specifications.
Table 5 reports the results of a specification which permits the
coefficients of the indices of adverse events on upland and lowland plots to
vary according to the sample households net borrower/net lender status.

The

results show that when adverse shocks are received by sample households which
are borrowers, they pay back less.

This is consistent with conventional

models of loan contracting, as the lower repayments may simply reflect a
24

higher incidence of default on the part of sample households which receive
adverse shocks.

On the other hand, the estimates also indicate that when

adverse shocks are received by sample households which are net lenders, they
are paid back more.

This finding cannot be understood in the context of

conventional models of the credit market and provides striking evidence that
repayments are state-contingent.

Owed repayments, therefore, depend upon the

realization of random production shocks by both borrower and lender, so these
loan transactions permit households (whether borrowing or lending) to insure
against at least some portion of output variability.

In fact, there is no

statistically significant difference between the responses of repayments to
adverse shocks received by net lenders and net borrowers. 13
2.

Other Results.

a. Wealth - As expected, increased wealth significantly increases net
lending; the effect of wealth on repayments, however, is insignificant.

The

model was re-estimated with the wealth variable disaggregated into livestock
and trading/grain stock components in order to test the joint hypothesis that
different types of wealth have different liquidity properties, and that these
differences would lead to an effect of asset composition on borrowing
behavior.

It is not possible, however, to reject the hypothesis that the

coefficients of the disaggregated components of wealth are equal.
b. Age - The age of the household head has no significant effect on net
borrowing (although the sign is as expected).

This result is robust to a

variety of different specifications of the AGE variable.

13A

Squared terms, dummy

likelihood ratio test of the restriction that the coefficients of the
indices of self-reported adverse shocks are the same for net borrowers and net
lenders yields a x2 with two degrees of freedom test statistic of 4.58, which is
insignificantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.
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variables with different age cutoffs, and linear splines in age were all
statistically insignificant.

On the other hand, older household heads receive

significantly higher net repayments.

This probably reflects their improved

access to information and enforcement mechanisms within the village, and
provides a warning that the competitive model misses institutional details
that are important to the operation of this market.
c. Period - The period coefficients are insignificantly different from
zero in all specifications.

This is to be expected if Tis large, and is

consistent with a Barro-Becker model of inter-generational altruism.

The

model was re-estimated with the PERIOD variable excluded and the coefficient
of the AGE variable free to vary depending upon net borrowing/lending status
(Table A.l).

In neither equation were the coefficients of the age variable

significantly different depending upon net borrowing/lending status.

In both

equations, the coefficients of the age variable were similar to those in the
specification that included the PERIOD variable.

This finding supports the

hypothesis that the AGE variable is playing the role described in the
preceding paragraph, and that Tis large enough that households are not making
significant yearly adjustments in their net borrowing in anticipation of their
final season's transaction.
d. Households containing at least one member with a special skill seem
to borrow more than other households, though the coefficient is
insignificantly different from zero.

This may reflect the extra working

capital required to employ these skills.

On the other hand, no indicator of

formal education - whether Islamic makaranta or western primary school - had
any effect on net borrowing or repayments.
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A test of the joint significance

of the education variables yields a x2 (4) test statistic of 0.82, which is
insignificantly different from zero (see Table A.2).
e. A household whose ancestors have been resident in the village for at
least two generations receives significantly higher loan repayments than does
a household whose family migrated to the village more recently.

As with the

AGE variable, this is likely to reflect the better access to information and
enforcement mechanisms of better-established households.

There is no evidence

that newer households respond to this by reducing their net lending.
f. Land - The relationship between net borrowing and land ownership is
weak and nonlinear.

The estimates imply that net borrowing is nearly

insensitive to ownership of upland and lowland land for holdings near the
sample ·mean.

The coefficients in the net borrowing equation for the ownership

of lowlands are jointly significantly different from zero.

The (imprecisely

estimated) coefficients imply that net borrowing is an increasing concave
function of lowlands ownership.

The turning point beyond which net borrowing

begins to decline is .5 hectares, just larger than the sample mean.

The

coefficients in the net borrowing equation for the ownership of uplands are
not jointly significantly different from zero.

The point estimates- imply that

net borrowing is a decreasing convex function of uplands ownership; the
turning point at which net borrowing begins to increase is 5.2 hectares, which
is just larger than the mean holding.

There is no statistically significant

relationship between ownership of uplands or lowlands and net repayments.
g. Friction - The friction coefficient is significantly different from
zero, providing support for the hypothesis of transactions costs.
h.

The village dummy variables are among the most significant

regressors in each of the specifications.
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They capture a variety of different

collinear effects.

It is impossible to disentangle, for example, the effect

of village level production shocks on loan demand from that of differences in
infrastructure across villages.
C. Testing Full Risk Pooling.
A Pareto efficient equilibrium with no transactions costs will have the
property that risks are completely pooled at the community level.
for full risk pooling are developed in this section.

Two tests

The first test emerges

from the result that without transactions costs, the amount borrowed or lent
by a household in any period depends only on aggregate community income in
that period.

That is, net lending is independent of the state of nature after

controlling for community income . 14

The second test relies on the fact that

if full risk pooling is achieved, the shocks received by the transaction
partners of a sample household should have no effect on loan repayments.

That

is, after controlling for community income, net repayments are independent of
the income of transaction partners.
To carry out the first test of full risk pooling, I include measures of
the idiosyncratic shocks received in 1987 (before this year's loans were made)
in the net borrowing equation.

Under the null hypothesis of complete risk

pooling, their coefficients are zero.

No index of self-reported events on the

household farm is available for the 1987 crop season, so the indicator of
random production shocks is based on the deviation of the household's
per-hectare yield from the village mean yield in 1987.
is broken down by lowland and upland plots.

14

This indicator (SHOCK)

To control for household fixed

This result remains even if some autocorrelation of random shocks is
allowed.
If village-wide shocks are correlated over time (e.g. droughts may
persist) but idiosyncratic shocks are not, then borrowing and lending are
unaffected by the idiosyncratic shock.
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effects (in reporting, field quality, and skill) the 1987 yield deviation is
differenced from the· deviation in 1988.

If the idiosyncratic shock to output

is uncorrelated over time, then this differencing introduces an errors-in
variables problem of the classic sort.
The model is re-estimated with the SHOCK variables included in the loan
size equation (Table 6).

The hypothesis of complete risk pooling can not be

rejected, as the coefficients are not jointly significantly different from
zero.

The likelihood ratio test of their joint significance yields a x2 (2)

test statistic of 3.34.

However, the coefficient on lowland yields has the

expected sign and approaches conventional levels of significance.
Exceptionally good yields on lowland farms seem to decrease borrowing in the
succeeding season, contrary to the null hypothesis of full risk pooling.

The

power of the test is difficult to evaluate because of the errors-in-variables
that arise when the null hypothesis is rejected.

The reported t-ratios of the

coefficients of the SHOCK variables and the likelihood ratio test statistic
are correct under the null hypothesis.
To carry out the second test of full risk pooling, I include a measure
of the adverse shocks received by the transactions partner of the sample
household in the repayment equation.

This variable is the proportion of the

total value of loans of the sample household which was transacted with
partners who received an adverse shock between the time the loan was made and
when it was repaid.

The competitive model developed implies that this

variable should have no effect on loan repayments.

The effect of the average

shock received by the village on repayments should be captured in the village
dummy variable.

If the shocks received by transactions partners have an

effect on repayments received by a sample household, the household has not
29

sufficiently spread its loan transactions around the village, and has
subjected itself to theoretically diversifiable risk.

In a Pareto efficient

equilibrium, the state-contingent net repayments to the sample household
(whether borrowing or lending) will depend on the random shocks it receives
and on total village income, but not on the idiosyncratic shocks affecting any
other household.

The estimate presented in Table 7 indicates that adverse

shocks received by transactions partners reduce the loan repayments received
by sample households.

Loan repayments to sample households and, therefore,

consumption by sample households vary according to the realization of
idiosyncratic shocks by their transaction partners.

While these state

contingent loan transactions allow households to insure against some
idiosyncratic risk, they do not permit the realization of a fully Pareto
efficient pooling of risk within the village.

This is evidence that the

competitive model ignores institutional details of the loan transactions which
have a real effect on the operation of the credit market.
6. Credit as Insurance: Summary and Directions for Future Research.
The rural credit market in northern Nigeria appears to be significantly
different from the idealized markets that appear in theoretical work on the
subject and perhaps from its counterparts in other areas of the world.

There

is only minimal use of collateral and no evidence of contractual interlinkage
with other markets.

Contractual mechanisms to alleviate the difficulties

posed by information asymmetries are not necessary because credit moves
through paths that take advantage of the extremely free flow of information
within a rural community. In this information environment, state-contingent
credit contracts which allow risk sharing between creditor and debtor, and
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which conform to the prohibition on fixed interest charges by Shari'a law, are
made and enforced.
The existence of such state-contingent payments embedded within loan
repayments has been confirmed.

In northern Nigeria, the credit market serves

its traditional role of smoothing the consumption effects of an income shock
over time.

In addition, however, this credit market permits households within

a community to directly insure each other against idiosyncratic risks.
The estimation carried out in this paper was based on a model of a
competitive market for loans in which households are price-takers.

This

Walrasian approach has enabled me to outline the general equilibrium
consequences of state-contingent contracting, and to derive the efficiency
properties of such equilibria.

The dynamic paths of the terms at which loans

are_ made and of individual households' participation in the credit market
became clear.

Moreover, the estimation results accord well with the

predictions of the general equilibrium model.
The approach taken in this paper treats these highly personalized
transactions as abstract events in a perfectly competitive market.

However,

it is possible to reject the hypothesis that a fully Pareto efficient risk
pooling allocation of village resources is achieved through these loans.
Therefore, an investigation of the institutional arrangements which support
these loan transactions is required before the economic role of the credit
market can be fully understood.
One consequence of the high level of abstraction in this paper is the
absence of any attempt to address the social context within which these
transactions oc~ur.

This absence manifests itself in a number of ways.

First, as noted above, the model has given no attention the possibility of
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default.
attention.

More generally, information asymmetries have received only brief
While I have argued that information moves between borrowers and

lenders more freely than is permitted in much of the theoretical literature, I
cannot preclude entirely the possibility of some degree of adverse selection
or moral hazard.

Most importantly, the approach of this paper sheds no light

on the institutional setting of the credit transactions.

The loans flow

between individuals who live within the same village, or who are relatives,
and whose behavior surely is influenced by the norms of this larger community.
In Udry (1991a) I attempt to remedy these weaknesses by carefully examining
the intricacies of the relationship between a borrower and a lender within the
context of rules set by the village community.
An issue immediately arises from the analysis of this paper which can
not be directly address by these data.

The credit market described above is

an important mechanism for pooling risks within a local community.

It is

known, however, that production shocks tend to be highly correlated over small
areas within the semi-arid tropics. 15

What mechanisms exist (if any) to

provide for flows of resources into or out of these local communities when
they are subject to important community-level shocks?

There is evidence from

other studies 16 and from the non-survey portions of my fieldwork, that
village based long distance traders may play an important role by providing
"pipelines" for the flow of resources across community boundaries.

This

process can be theoretically modelled, but its quantitative importance cannot
be evaluated until data is available from a much wider cross section, or from
a time series over a particular village.
15
16

See Ruthenberg (1971).
See especially Clough (1981, 1986).
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Appendix A: A Competitive Model
The first order conditions from equations 1-3 yield:
Al.

B1rs U' (c~ (h ))
0

s
ql (ho) -

for alls,

U' (c )
0

for alls, 1 < t

A2.

~

T,

st-1
where Ct-l (ht_ 1 ) is consumption in state St-l realized in period t-1 in history
ht-l·

We can use the result that consumption will be time-and history-

independent in any Pareto optimum to find:
S
st-1
qt(ht-1)
U'(ct-1 (ht-1))
A3.
for alls, l~t~T.
Therefore, the scaling factor r in any period will depend only on
st -l (h )
. d consumption
.
. t h e previous
.
. d , Ct-l
. turn
rea1 ize
in
perio
t-l , wh.ic h in
depends only on total community income.
Adding Production.
Let Y = g(s,k), where k is the amount of the good Y devoted to
production on a fixed amount of land.

Since the amount of land is fixed, it

is embodied in the function g(). There is no labor; corn is simply invested to
produce more corn.
A4.

co

yo -

The budget constraints must be modified:

ql(ho) . Rl(ho)

s

- kl(ho)

s

ct(ht-1) =g(s,kt) + Rt(ht-1) - qt+l(ht) . Rt+l(ht) - kt+l(ht)
s

s

cT(hT-1) = g(s,kT) + R.r(hT-1).
Using the F.O.C. for securities purchases and kt, we find:
AS. rt~ [qs og(s,k)/okt]

1

for

1

~

t

~

T.

This can be interpreted as MVPk = MC, and the production decision is separable
from consumption. If g(s,k)
A6. rt g'(kt) x~ qs es

esg(k) this simplifies to
1

and households whoch own farms whose output is less correlated with overall
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output (as indexed by q) invest more.
Adding Alternative Assets.
Y is now Y(s,k1 ,k2 ), where k 1 and k 2 are analogous to k above.

The fixed

amounts of land to which k 1 and k 2 are applied are embodied in the function Y.
The budget constraints become:
A7.

c

y
0
s

C

t

0
(h

t-1

1 2
s
1
Y(s,k ,k) + R (h
) - q
(h) · R
(h) - k
(h)
t t
t t-1
t+l t
t+l t
t+l t

)

- k

1
2
- kl(ho) - kl(ho)

ql(ho) . Rl(ho)

2

t+l

(h)

t

s
1 2
s
),
cT(hT-l) = Y(s,kT,kT) + R (h
T T-1

where we may wish to specialize Y(s,k1 ,k2 ) to g(s,k 1 ) + h(s,k2 ).

With

multiplicative shocks this becomes 8 5 g(k 1 ) + 0 5 h(k2 ), where 1r·S = 1r·O = 1.
More generally, as long as o2Y/ok1 ok2 = 0 the F.O.C. reported above do not
change. The F.O.C. with respect to k 2 t are analogous to those for kt, and
yield:
A8.

,,.

~

t s

[q

s oh< s , k 2 ) /

ok2

l
•1

t J

for

1

1

~

t

~

T.

or if we assume multiplicative shocks:
A9.

2

,,. h'(k)
t

t

~

s

s s
q ·O

1.

Note in particular that investment in these alternative assets is independent
of the correlation between O and 8.
household level.

There is no incentive to diversify at the

All diversification remains at the village level.
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Appendix B: The Likelihood Function
Consider the contributions to the sample likelihood of three
observationally distinguishable groups of households: (1) those who did not
participate in the credit market; (2) those who were net borrowers; (3) those
who were net lenders.

(1) For household i which did not participate in the market, the model
of equations 20-22 implies

< 0

and

X a+ a P + v
- F
i
L i
li

> 0.

X a+ a P
i

B i

+ v

li

The contribution of this household to the sample likelihood is

Pr(-a P > v
Bi

li

+ X a> -a P + F).
i

Li

(2) For household j which was a net borrower, the model implies
V

V

lj
2j

= B

a P

X a

j

B j

j

= REP

j

= v

- X.f3 - fJ p
B j
J

and

lj

- s.1

=

J

V

2j

The contribution of this household to the sample likelihood is then
f(v

lj ,v 2j)'

where f() is the bivariate normal density.
(3) For household k which was a net lender, the model implies

v

v

lk

2k

B - Xa - a P + F = v
k
k
L k
lk

REP

k

and

- X /J - /JP - S -y = v
k
Lk
k
2k

The contribution of this household to the sample likelihood is then
f(v

lk

,v

2k

).

The sample likelihood is the product of the individual contributions of the
196 observations.
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Table 1: Summary Data (n-198)
Mean

Std. Deviation

Household size

8.5

4.1

--males aged 10-60
- household head
- all children over 10
- other males over 10

2.7
1.0
1.0
.7

1. 7

--female aged 10-60
- wives
- children over 10

2.0
1. 7
.3

1.3
.9
.7

--young children
--elderly

3.4

.4

2.4
.7

42

12.4

Operational
land holdings (Ha)
uplands
-- fadama

3.8
3.3
.5

4.3
4.0
1.0

Owned land (Ha)
- -uplands
- -fadama

3.6
3.2
.4

5.1
4.7
1.0

N4154

Nl4922

N2700

N7884

Value of grain holdings (Naira)
August
597
- - January
5058

114

Daily male agricultural wage

Nl9

N47*

Loan size (Naira) (n=821)

291

719

Age of household head

Value of livestock (July)
-excluding 2 Fulani
households

Household totals, over survey period (Naira):
Gross Borrowing
352
-- Gross Lending
596

1.4
1.1

978

1015
2679

The exchange rate ranged from $1 = N4 in February, 1988 to
$1 = N7 in February, 1989.
*The high variability results from seasonal changes in the wage rate.
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Table 2: Realized Terms vs. Borrower and Lender Shocks Received
Sample means
Adverse shock
received by:

monthly interest
rates

(A) Borrower
-no shock

0.5%

20.4%

67

-4.0%

-0.6%

72

lower
(1. 58)

lower
(2.20)

longer
(1.03)

-7.5%

-5.0%

89

2.6%

11.8%

80

higher
(4.56)

higher
(3.06)

shorter
(1. 89)

-shock
Impact of shock
on mean:
(t)
(B) Lender
-no shock
-shock
Impact of shock
on mean:
(t)

simple interest
rates

repayment
period in days

The impact of the shocks is judged by a two-sided t-test of equal means
(JLnoshock-JLshock).
The absolute value of the t-statistic is in parentheses.
The definition of 'adverse shock' is that of table 4, broadened to include
lenders:
1. A respondent (borrower or lender) is judged to have received an
adverse shock if he reported an unexpected adverse event on any of the fields
he farms during the term of the loan. Common events were flooding, wind
damage, or infestation by insects.
2. The other party (borrower or lender) is judged to have received an
adverse shock if the respondent reported an unexpected, serious event that
occurred in the other household during the term of the loan. Common events
were farming events as in (1), and medical problems, rain damage to houses,
and other 'household emergencies'.
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Table 3: Variables Used in the Competitive Model

LOAN

SIZE

net amount borrowed (x NlOO)

Mean

Std,

-1.91

24.16

REPAYMENT

net amount repaid (xNlOO)
(to sample household by others)

2.50

26.75

WEALTH

value of livestock, household articles,
grain and trading stocks evaluated at the
start of the survey (xlOOO).

2.25

45.12

40.64

12.23

0.54

1. 73

23.69

24.26

AGE

age in years of household head.

PRIMARY

number of years of western schooling
completed by household head.

ISLAM

number of Koran sections known by
household head.

HERELONG

dummy variable. 1 if family of household
head has been in village 2 or more
generations.

0.68

0.47

SKILLS

dummy variable. 1 if at least one member
of household has special skills.

0.60

0.24

UPLAND

gona (upland) land owned in hectares.

3.24

4.69

LOWLAND

fadama (lowland) land owned in hectares.

0.44

1.04

PERIOD:

number of years since the household head
first married, or since he moved to
this village, whichever is smaller.

16.07

10.00

UPROBLEM

index of self-reported problems
on upland farms.

0.22

0.35

LPROBLEM

index of self-reported problems
on lowland farms.

0.27

0.26

USHOCK

difference between yield last year
and this year on uplands.

0.49

1. 20

LSHOCK

difference between yield last year
and this year on lowlands.

0.54

0.83

PARTPROB

proportion of loans with partners who
received adverse shocks

0.20

0.30
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TABLE 4
Competitive Model FIML Estimates
Loan Size
(net amount borrowed)

Repayments
(net amount paid in)

(xNlOO)

(xNlOO)

Variable

Parameter
CONSTANT
VILI.AGEl
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
AGE
HERELONG
SKILLS DUMMY
UPLAND
UPLAND SQUARED
LOWLAND
LOWLAND SQUARED

-2.947
1.490
2.081
0.529
-0.058
0.029
0.227
0.456
-0.291
0.028
0.259
-0.258

PERIOD
LENDING
BORROWING
FRICTION CUTOFF

T-Ratio
-2.40
1.88
2.94
0. 72
-1.83
0.96
0.38
0.85
-1. 73*

T-Ratio

0.31*
-1. 321

-0.989
-0.287
0.016
-0.601
-0.010
0.017
0.511
-0.317
0.001
0.000
-0.347
0.073

0.05
-2.04
-0.54
1.40
2.14
-1.48
0.021
0.011
-1.10§
0. 99§

-0.002
-0.025

-0.06
-0.64

-0.009
-0.008

-0.56
-0.44

-1. 869

-3.38
0.742
1.200

2.08
3.07

1. 882

28.27

3 .oo*

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
a
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

Parameter

1. 829
-0.948

30.55
-24.76

-2.02
-0. 92

-LN(Likelihood) = 848.86
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.18.
*Jointly significant at the 5 percent level. The likelihood ratio test of
the restriction that both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test
statistic of 6.43.
1Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 2.47.
5Not jointly significant.
The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 1.21.
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TABLE 5
Testing the Responsiveness of Contract Terms to Shocks:
Net Borrowing Households vs. Net Lending Households

Variable

Loan Size
(net amount borrowed)

Repayments
(net amount paid in)

(xNl00)

(xNl00)

Parameter

T-Ratio

Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILI.AGEl
VILI.AGE2
VILI.AGE3
WEALTH
AGE
HERELONG
SKILLS DUMMY
UPLAND
UPLAND SQUARED
LOWLAND
LOWLAND SQUARED

-2.947
1.490
2.081
0.529
-0.058
0.029
0.227
0.456
-0.291
0.028
0.259
-0.258

-2.40
1.88
2.94
0. 72
-1. 83
0.96
0.38
0.85
-1. 73*
3.00*
0.31#
-1. 32#

-1.038
-0.209
-0.001
-0.520
-0.008
0.021
0.472
-0.320
0.008
-0.000
-0.429
0.090

-0.04~
-1.37§
1. 23 5

PERIOD
LENDING
BORROWING

-0.002
-0.025

-0.06
-0.64

-0.008
-0.020

-0.48
-1.08

FRICTION CUTOFF

-1. 869

-3.38

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS
FOR NET BORROWERS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS

0.338
1.941

0.70
3.78

FOR NET LENDERS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS

0.969
0.350

2.14
0.63

1.876

28.30

(1

CORREI.ATION COEFFICIENT

1.829
-0.950

30.55
-24.97

-2.12
-0.67
-0.00
-1. 78
-0.44
1. 72
1. 98
-1.51
0.13~

-LN(Likelihood) - 846.57
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.06.
#Jointly significant at the 5 percent level. The likelihood ratio test of
the restriction that both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test
statistic of 6.43.
~Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.04.
§Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 1.89.
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TABLE 6
Testing Full Risk Pooling-Last Year's Yields

Variable

Loan Size
(net amount borrowed)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

CONSTANT
VILLAGE!
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
AGE
HERELONG
SKILLS DUMMY
UPLAND
UPLAND SQUARED
LOWLAND
LOWLAND SQUARED

-2.725
1.068
1.856
0.750
-0.055
0.016
-0.098
0.645
0.113
-0.002
0.431
-0.237

PERIOD
LENDING
BORROWING
FRICTION CUTOFF

T-Ratio
-2.09
1. 31
2.38
0.99
-1.66
0.52
-0.16
1.16
0. 76*

Repayments
(net amount paid in)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

T-Ratio

0.50*
-1.15*

-0.292
0.014
-0.599
-0.010
0.017
0.510
-0.316
0.004
-0.000
-0.343
0.073

-2.03
-0.95
0.05
-2.05
-0.53
1.41
2.15
-1.48
0.08'
-0.081
-1.10 5
0.99 5

-0.006
-0.020

-0.15
-0.51

-0.009
-0.008

-0.56
-0.44

-2.001

-3.51

-o. so*

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
YIELD LAST YEAR
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS

0.030
-0.489

-1.49

a
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

1. 859
-0.952

30.63
-25.38

-0.988

)

0.743
1.199

2.09
3.08

1.909

28.22

.0.13

-LN(Likelihood) - 847.19
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.71.
'Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 3.30.
'Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.01.
5Not jointly significant.
The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 1.23.
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TABLE 7

Testing Full Risk Pooling-The Significance of Partner's Shocks

Variable

Loan Size
(net amount borrowed)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

T-Ratio

Repayments
(net amount paid in)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILLAGEl
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
AGE
HERELONG
SKILLS DUMMY
UPLAND
UPLAND SQUARED
LOWLAND
LOWLAND SQUARED

-3.095
1.091
1.951
0.798
-0.055
0.020
0.009
0. 713
0.086
-0.002
0.650
-0.288

-2.42
1. 33
2.65
1.05
-1.65
0.64
0.01
1.28
0. 59*
-0.36*
0. 77 11
-1.4111

-0.756
-0.258
0.123
-0.564
-0.010
0.016
0.466
-0.330
0.005
-0.000
-0.377
0.079

-1.54
-0.86
0.44
-1. 96
-0.57
1. 37
1.98
-1.58
0.09'!1
-0.15'!1
-1. 23 5
1.09 5

PERIOD
LENDING
BORROWING

-0.012
-0.026

-0.31
-0.64

-0.007
-0.010

-0.43
-0.56

FRICTION CUTOFF

-2.032

-3.54
0. 771
1.051

2.21
2.70

-0.648

-2.10

1.909

28.20

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
LOAN PARTNERS WITH SHOCKS
(proportion of total loan value)
(1

CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

1.867
-0.953

30.62
-25.67

-LN(Likelihood) = 846.15
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.45.
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 3.70.
'!!Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.03.
5Not jointly significant.
The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 1.53.
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TABLE A.1
Interaction Effects Between Age and Net
Borrowing/Lending Status

Variable

Loan Size
(net amount borrowed)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

CONSTANT
VILLAGE!
VILLAGE2
VILLAGE3
WEALTH
HERELONG
SKILLS DUMMY
UPLAND
UPLAND SQUARED
LOWLAND
LOWLAND SQUARED
AGE
LENDING
BORROWING
FRICTION CUTOFF

T-Ratio

Parameter

T-Ratio

-2.836
1.168
1. 982
0.681
-0.055
-0.058
0.098
0.087
-0.002
0.661
-0.291

-2.24
1.39
2.67
0.90
-1. 65
-0.09
0.34
0. 59•
-0. 34•
0. 78 11
~1.43#

-1.140
-0.186
0.032
-0.573
-0.005
0.497
-0.194
0.015
-0.000
-0.384
0.080

-2.56
-0.59
0.11
-2.00
-0.27
2.10
-1. 79
0.29,i
-0.29,i
-1. 25 5
1.10 5

0.005
0.012

0.21
0.46

0.013
0.018

1. 36
1.88

-2.561

-2.43
0. 729
1.281

2.15
3.33

1.937

28.07

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
a
CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

Repayments
(net amount paid in)
(xNlOO)

1.871
-0.955

30.63
-25.94

-LN(Likelihood) - 848.45
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.49.
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 3.71.
,iNot jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.09.
5Not jointly significant.
The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 1.59.
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TABLE A.2
Testing the Effect of Education

Variable

Loan Size
(net amount borrowed)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

T-Ratio

Repayments
(net amount paid in)
(xNlOO)
Parameter

T-Ratio

CONSTANT
VILl.AGEl
VILl.AGE2
VIL1AGE3
WEALTH
AGE
HERELONG
SKILLS DUMMY
UPLAND
UPLAND SQUARED
LOWLAND
LOWLAND SQUARED

-2.550
1.161
2.036
0.741
-0.056
0.018
-0.044
0.131
0.078
-0.001
0.741
-0.301

-2.00
1. 38
2.74
0.97
-1. 67
0.56
-0.07
0.45
0.53*
-0. 29*
0. 87 1
-1.471

-1.060
-0.160
0.033
-0.533
-0.006
0.020
0.475
-0.206
0.017
-0.000
-0.370
0.079

-2.25
-0.50
0.12
-1.84
-0.31
1. 60
2.00
-1. 86
0. 321
-0.34'
-1.19 5
1.08 5

PRIMARY
ISLAM

-0.126
0.001

-0. 77
0.12

-0.044
-0.002

-0. 71
-0.49

PERIOD
LENDING
BORROWING

-0.018
-0.032

-0.44
-0.76

-0.008
-0.011

-0.48
-0.61

FRICTION CUTOFF

-2.021

-3.53
0.669
1. 299

1.87
3.32

1. 913

28.05

INDEX OF SELF-REPORTED SHOCKS
ON UPLANDS
ON LOWLANDS
u

CORRELATION COEFFICIENT

1.869
-0.953

30.60
-25.50

-LN(Likelihood) = 847.73
*Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.41.
'Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 3.59.
1Not jointly significant. The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both uplands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 0.12.
5Not jointly significant.
The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that
both lowlands coefficients are zero yields a x2 (2) test statistic of 1.43.
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